Why smarter AI models could drive up compute prices 10x

Dwarkesh Podcast
3 August 2026 11 min
0:00 --:--
Episode Description
This is a video recording of a post I wrote last week. If you want to read the original you can check it out here.Thanks to Mercury for sponsoring this video. Mercury’s built-in AI, Command, helps me close my books and saves me a bunch of time. At the end of each month, Command categorizes my transactions and provides its rationale for every choice: I just review, fix anything that’s off, and approve... and then Mercury syncs everything to QuickBooks. Get started at mercury.com/command Get full

Summary

This episode analyzes the economic dynamics behind AI compute costs and lab revenues, focusing on why smarter AI models could drive compute prices up by 10x. It explores the interplay between lab margins, compute price increases, and the shifting balance between training and inference compute usage, while considering supply constraints and market implications.

Chapters

AI Revenue and Compute TrendsOverview of Anthropix's rapid revenue growth and the disparity between revenue growth and compute capacity increases.
Margins, Compute Prices, and InferenceDiscussion of three factors enabling revenue growth: lab margins, compute price increases, and rising inference compute share.
Lab Strategies and Market ImplicationsWhy labs prefer investing in training over inference and the implications for AI progress and business models.
Compute Pricing and Economic ValueAnalysis of compute pricing relative to human labor value and the economic effects of AI-driven compute demand.
Supply Constraints on Compute GrowthExamination of physical and technological bottlenecks limiting compute capacity growth to about 3x per year.
Future Outlook and Power ConcentrationReflections on the strong economies of scale in AI, potential power concentration, and the eventual lowering of compute costs.
Sponsor Message: Mercury AI ToolIntroduction to Mercury's AI-powered financial tool, Command, which automates transaction categorization and bookkeeping.

Topics

AI compute costsLab revenue growthInference vs trainingCompute supply constraintsEconomic value of computeAI market dynamicsMoore's Law limitsAI automation economicsCompute pricingAI business marginsMercury Command tool

People

Anthropic (mentioned) Google (mentioned) OpenAI (mentioned) Dylan (mentioned) Paul Ehrlich (mentioned) Simon (mentioned)
Key Concepts (10)
Revenue vs Compute Growth — AI lab revenues are growing roughly 10x year over year while compute capacity only grows about 3x, creating a gap that must be explained by margins, compute price, or inference share changes.
Inference Compute Share — The proportion of compute spent on inference is increasing, potentially up to 50%, but labs prefer to focus on training to continue AI progress.
Lab Margin Expansion — Lab inference margins have reportedly increased from 40% to 80%, possibly rising further if models become significantly better than competitors.
Compute Price Increases — Spot prices for compute have risen over 40% since early 2024, and specialized large-scale compute rentals cost significantly more than spot prices.
Economic Value of AI Compute — If AI models reach human-level software engineering ability, the value of compute (e.g., H100 GPUs) could be 15x higher than current prices, reflecting the marginal value of labor analogy.
Lump of Labor Fallacy — The argument that increasing AI compute and automation won't necessarily reduce the marginal value of labor, paralleling economic views on immigration and labor supply shocks.
Alkin Allen Effect — Higher compute prices incentivize using more efficient AI models, as cheaper but less efficient models become uneconomical on expensive compute.
Compute Supply Elasticity Limits — Compute capacity growth is limited by Moore's Law slowing, fab construction bottlenecks, and wafer allocation constraints, making 3x annual growth difficult to sustain.
Economies of Scale in AI — AI models benefit from strong economies of scale because training costs are one-time and skills are shared across users, unlike human labor.
Power Concentration Risk — Strong economies of scale in AI intelligence may lead to concentration of power among leading labs.
References (4)
Ehrlich-Simon Bet by Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon historical event
Mercury Command by Mercury tool
TSMC N3 Nodes by TSMC technology
ASML EUV Machines by ASML technology
Transcript (1 segments)
Speaker 1

Today I wanna talk about what the compute situation for the labs will look like over the next few years. For the last three consecutive years, Anthropix revenue has 10xed year over year and it's likely to do so again this year. So they ended last year with 9,000,000,000 in revenue.

I think they'll probably end this year with somewhere between 100,000,000,000 to $150,000,000,000 in revenue. Now for this trend to continue, Anthropic would need to make $1,000,000,000,000 in revenue by the end of next year. Of course, there's no deep reason why this has to be true.

It's a very wild conclusion and it's ultimately a question of AI capabilities. Does AI get that useful by the end of next year? But suppose the trend does continue.

Well, I wanna think through what happens in that world. Now, other big trend in AI is that lab compute only three Xs year over year. For a lab to keep 10 revenue year over year while compute only three Xs, one of the following three things needs to happen or some combination of the three needs to happen.

One, lab margins have to increase. Two, the price of compute has to increase. Or three, the percentage of compute that labs spend on inference rather than training has to increase.

My understanding is that basically all three of these things are already happening. With regards to the margins, Anthropix inference margins reportedly went from 40% in the middle of last year to upwards of 80% now available. With regards to compute, the spot prices for compute are more than 40% higher than they were in the February trough that we had earlier this year.

And with regards to the share compute that goes to trading versus inference, in 2024 according to epoch, OpenAI was spending just a quarter of its compute on inference and that number is likely closer to 50% if not higher now. Now labs would prefer not to do this final thing of increasing the share of compute they spend on inference. The way the labs see the world, the whole point of inference revenue is to help convince investors to give you more money in order to train the next bigger, better model.

And if you're spending most of your compute on inference, you're basically declaring that AI progress has stalled and you're just now in the business of being a cloud provider. Now, this is a less compelling business than building AGI. So And the labs do not want to be in this business nor do they think they're in this world.

They think that within a year they'll have built models that make the current ones look extremely shitty, but they need to invest a lot of their compute, the majority of their compute into doing the training and experiments that are necessary to build the next model. So that leaves only two options for how you can get out of this gap between the fact that lab compute only increases 3x year over year, but revenue increases 10x. Either the lab's margins have to increase so that they get the surplus or the price of compute has to increase so that everybody in the stack below the lab gets a surplus.

It's not clear to me which world we end up in. Do we end up in a world where we go from 80% margins for some of the top models to greater than 90% margins if the lab margin effect dominates? Well, that would require the leading model to be so far ahead of the competition because the nature of margins, why they exist in a market economy is that the thing you are serving is so much better than what somebody else could go get and replace you on the market.

But it's just really wild for me to consider that the margins for something like intelligence will be greater than 90% and they don't get competed away at that level. So that leaves only one other possibility of this escape valve between these two trends, which is that the price of compute has to increase. As As I mentioned, this is already starting to happen.

And the effect is even stronger when you look at the tranche of compute that the frontier labs actually need to accumulate because they can't just go out and buy a spot instance. They need to make sure that they get enough scale to get really good efficiency and flexibility and also that they have the kind of compute that lends itself to the security they need for their own ways and for their customers information. So, I think a relevant case study here is to look at the compute that Google and Anthropic are renting from SpaceX.

Google, for example, is paying $900,000,000 a month for a 110,000 GPUs that are a blend of GB two hundreds and GB three hundreds. The price that Google is paying here is two x the spot price per hour for those GPUs. And that spot price itself is more than 40% higher than it would have been in February.

I wanna emphasize the key conclusion here that as AI models get smarter, they'll be better able to monetize the same amount of compute. If a true human level software engineer could run on an H100 equivalent, then at today's prices for software engineers, that h 100 should rent for over 250 k a year. That's over 15 x the current spot price for an h one hundred.

And this is not even accounting for the fact that your AI can work nights and weekends. Of course, might expect that if we had 10,000,000 extra software engineers suddenly appear in the economy, the marginal value of a software engineer would decrease and thus the revenue that that H100 would be able to generate would not be 15x higher than it is right now. But I actually don't know if this is true.

If we apply this argument to people instead of AIs, then this would be the classic lump of labor fallacy. For example, economists generally believe that high school immigration does not decrease wages in the long run because of how innovation and specialization increase the value of labor. Maybe this labor supply shock will be so big and so fast that we can't count on this general heuristic anymore.

But if you believe what standard economics says, then the marginal value of labor and thus the marginal value of compute should stay astonishingly high. So let's think about what changes in such a world. Well, one of the things that would happen is that as the top labs get better and better at monetizing compute and the cost of compute increases, it becomes harder for anybody else to compete against them because they have to bid for this resource against somebody who is basically able to make better use of it.

Another thing that will happen, and I think this is actually the most interesting implication of this whole thought exercise, is that if you can train the best, most efficient model, then you'll be able to charge much higher margins than you can today. This is the Alkin Allen effect in economics. And what it's basically saying is that it would cost $20 an hour to rent an H100.

That would be extremely stupid to use a weaker, less efficient model because it's gonna burn more tokens on your expensive compute to get the exact same result. So labs will be able to charge a much larger premium if they can train a model that better economizes this scarce input. Basically, if you have a model that can get the same result by using less compute, then you've in some sense created more compute and the value of compute is gonna increase.

Another thing that will happen is that a lot of current popular applications of AI will probably get priced out. The reason AI is relatively cheap right now is that AI just can't do a lot of things that top humans can do. But this at some point will no longer be the case.

And at that point, Google or Anthropic or OpenAI will be willing to pay more for the tokens to automate AI research than you or I will be willing to pay to make more AI slop talk. I'm a bit worried that this kind of analysis honestly pattern matches a lot onto the ways that people in the past have been wrong about scarcity. I'm for example thinking of the famous Simon Ehrlich bet.

Paul Ehrlich was this famous doomer about population growth and he made this bet that a basket of commodities would increase in price rather than decrease in the decade preceding 1990. And this is a very famous bet because it's supposed to illustrate how Ehrlich's Malthusian worldview was wrong and how he did not anticipate the way in which market signals and human ingenuity can find better ways to economize scarce inputs. I'm guessing that the analogy to this bet is probably wrong.

Other analysis has shown that if that bet had been made in a different decade, Ehrlich might well have won. But more generally, I think the supply of compute is much less elastic and much less capable of absorbing large demand shocks and much less capable of being accommodated by using different substitutes than the extraction of different metals. To illustrate why I think this 3x in compute capacity year over year is hard to budge or potentially even sustain is that I don't see how any of the three elements that constitute that three x can be much accelerated.

So 1.4 x of that is coming from Moore's Law. Far from increasing it, think it'll be a miracle if you can just keep it going for a few more years.

1.2 X is coming from building new fabs. This process is ultimately gonna be bottlenecked up to 2030 and potentially even beyond by just building new ASML EUV machines.

Dylan, when he was on the podcast a few months ago talked about this in great detail. And 1.8 x comes from the fact that AI is absorbing a lot of wafer allocation that was previously going to smartphones and PCs.

This is probably gonna hit a wall by the end of next year when at the leading edge N3 nodes at TSMC, AI will have gone from 60% to 86. At some point, you have just absorbed all leading edge wafer capacity for AI and you can't keep increasing this number. So I don't know how we get even to continue to do three x compute scaling year over year for the next few years, much less go beyond that.

At the end of the month, I go through the time honored tradition of closing my books. I start by opening Mercury, which is my banking platform, to make sure that all my transactions are properly categorized. Auto categorization rules handle the predictable stuff pretty well, but I'm constantly working with new contractors, you know, tutors and researchers and videographers, and I'm also trying new tools.

Manually categorizing all of these transactions would add a couple of hours of overhead every single month. So instead of going through them one by one, I have Command, which is Mercury's built in AI, take a stab at all of them at once. Command proposes a category for each transaction and provides its rationale.

I just review, I fix anything that's off, and I approve. And once all this work is done in Mercury, it syncs everything with QuickBooks. And Command's judgment calls are genuinely good.

It does the obvious things like looking at the vendor, but it also investigates who on my team made the purchase and looks at notes and memos to build up as much context as possible. This is just one of the ways you can use Command to automate the back end of your business. To learn more, go to mercury.

com/command. Mercury is a fintech company, not an FDIC insured bank. Banking services provided through Choice Financial Group in column NA, members FDIC.

AI generated responses and suggested actions may vary and are not guaranteed. Now, I want to clarify that at some point in the future, compute will get cheap again. At some point, we'll just have robots that can convert shores of silica sand and mines of copper into new computer chips.

And then the price of compute is basically the raw inputs and the tools required to do this processing. I'm just talking about this current presingularity regime where AI compute merely three Xs year over year, which is not enough to offset how much more valuable AI is becoming over time. By the way, the fact that Anthropic revenue has been 10x in year over year, whereas their compute has only been 3x in year over year, I think illustrates how strong the economies of scale are in the model business.

And logically, this makes sense. When you train a model, just had to spend this one time cost to learn all these different skills that then get to be shared across all your users. This is very unlike human labor where each instance has to be retrained from scratch.

I wish we didn't live in a world with such strong economies of scale for intelligence because I'm worried about power concentration but it seems we do. Okay, this was a narration of a blog post that I also released on my website at dwarkesh.com.

Check it out for other posts or to be notified when I release a post in the future. Otherwise, I'll see you for the next full episode.

Shared via Hopper