Dwarkesh and Michael Nielsen delve into how scientific progress is truly recognized, often contrasting popular narratives with historical realities, such as the Michelson-Morley experiment's role in special relativity. They explore the long verification loops in science through examples like heliocentrism and Darwinism, and discuss the philosophical implications of AI models like AlphaFold as scientific explanations. The conversation also touches on the vast, branching nature of scientific discovery, the challenges of fostering deep understanding, and the evolving political economy of open science.
Today, I'm speaking with Michael Nielsen. You have done many things. You're one of pioneers of quantum computing, wrote the main textbook in the field of the open science movement.
You wrote a book about deep learning that Chris Ola and Greg Brockman credit them with getting them into the field. More recently, you're a research fellow at the Astero Institute and writing a book about religion, science, and technology. I'm going ask you about none of those things.
The conversation I want to have today is, how do we recognize scientific progress? And it's especially relevant for AI because people are trying to close the RL verification loop on scientific discovery. And what does it mean to close that loop?
But in preparing for this interview, I've realized that it's a more mysterious and elusive, force even in the history of human science than I understood. And I think a good place to start will be Michelson Morley and how special relativity is discovered, if it's different than the story that you kind of get off of YouTube videos. Anyways, I'll prompt you that way, and then we'll go in there.
Okay. Yeah.
one of the sort of the famous results often presented as this experiment that was done in the 1880s and that helped Einstein come up with the special theory of relativity a little bit later. So sort of changing the way we think about space and time and our fundamental conception of those things. And there's kind of a big gap, I think, between the way Michelson and Morley and other people at the time thought about the experiment and certainly the way in which Einstein thought or did not think about the experiment.
In actual fact, he stated later in his life, he wasn't even sure whether he was aware of the paper at the time. There's a lot of evidence that he probably was aware of the paper at the time, but it actually wasn't dispositive for his thinking at all. Something else completely was going on.
So, what Michelson and Molley thought they were doing was they thought they were testing different theories of what was called the ether. So as you go back to the 1600s, Robert Boyle introduced the idea of the ether, and basically the idea of the is, you know, we know that sound is vibrations in the air, and then Boyle and other people got interested in the question of like is light vibrations in something, and they couldn't figure out what it was. Boyle actually did an experiment where he tested whether or not he could propagate through a vacuum.
He found that you could, you couldn't do it with sound. So he introduced this idea of the ether and then for the next two hundred or so years, people had all these kind of conversations about what the was and what its nature was. And the Michelson and Morley experiment was really an experiment to test different theories of the ether against one another and in particular to find out whether or not there was a so called ether wind.
So the idea was that the earth is passing through maybe this ether wind and if it is passing through the ether wind, sort of this background, and you shoot a light beam sort of parallel to the direction the wind is going in, it'll get accelerated a little bit and if it's being passed back sort of in the opposite direction, it will get slowed down a little bit and you should be able to see this in the results of interference experiments. And what they found, much to their surprise, think was that in fact there was no ether wind And that ruled out some theories of the but not all. And Michelson certainly continued to believe in the ether.
this story from the biography of Einstein that you recommended by, what was his first name? Abraham Pike. Abraham Pike.
Yes. So does the Lord. And then also from Imre Lacatos, the methodologies of scientific research programs.
The way it's told is that Michaelson Morley proved that the ether did not exist. Yeah. Therefore, it created a crisis in physics Yeah.
That Einstein saw saw the special relativity. Yeah. And Richard pointing out is actually was trying to distinguish between many different theories of You know, if you're in space or if you're on Earth, it's the same direction of ether.
Maybe the wind is being carried around by the Earth, so you can't really experience it on Earth. But if you go to a high enough altitude, you might be able to experience it. In fact, the Michaelson's experiments were the famous one is 1887, but he conducted these experiments for basically two decades.
For longer than that, he conducted them.
but he continued to believe until, I mean, he died. He died, I think it was like 1929 or so, it was like the late 20s. He was still doing experiments in the 1920s sort of about whether or not the ether existed.
So continued to believe in the ether to the end of his life. I think the last public statement he made is like a year or two before he died and he still believed, basically believed at that point.
who kept doing these experiments in the 1920s. He thought that he went to a high enough altitude. It was in Mount Wilson in California, where, oh, I'm high enough that I can actually the ether winds are not being dragged with it by the Earth.
I and I've measured, the effect of the And Einstein hears about this and he says this is where you get the famous quote, subtle is the lord, but malicious he is not. Anyways, I think the reason the story is interesting for for many different reasons, but one is one of the different ways in which the real history of science is different from this idea you get of the scientific method is you really can't apply falsification as easily as you might think. It's not clear what is being falsified.
Is it just another version of the theory of the ether that's being falsified? Or, certainly, you can't induce the theory of special relativity from the fact that one version of the ether seems to be disconfirmed by these experiments.
Yeah. I mean, it certainly doesn't show that ideas about falsification are wrong, are falsified. But it does show the most naive ideas, things are often much more complicated than you think.
Michaelson did this experiment in 1881, he was a very young man, and then other people, I think Rayleigh was one of them, pointed out that there were some problems with the way he did it so they had to redo it in 1887. And at that point, like a lot of the leading physicists of the day, leading scientists of the day, basically accepted this result that there was no ether wind. But what to do about this?
So yeah, sure, maybe you've falsified some theories of the ether. There are others that you haven't falsified at all at this point and people sort of set to work on developing those. Actually, it is funny, mean people will phrase it as show that there was, you know, that the ether didn't exist and even just the word the there is kind of a misnomer.
Actually had a ton of different theories and a couple of leading contenders. So yeah, there's some version of falsification going on but how you respond to this new experiment is very, very complicated. And most people responded, I mean certainly the leading physicists of the day responded by saying okay, this gives us a lot of information about what the must be but it doesn't tell us that there is no ether.
In fact, Lorentz Yeah.
figures out the math, how we convert from one, reference frame to another reference frame, comes up with the Lorentz transformations, which is basically the basis of special relativity. But his interpretation Yeah. Is that you are converting from the ether reference frame to these non privileged other reference frames if you're moving relative to the and his interpretation of length contraction and time dilation is that this is the effect of moving through the and you have this pressure and that the pressure is warping clocks, it's warping measures of length.
And the interesting thing here is that experimentally you cannot distinguish Lorentz's interpretation from special relativity.
Yeah, think that's a strong statement. Mean Lorentz introduces this quantity called local time, which he regards as not trying my understanding is he's not trying to give a a physical interpretation of this, but it's what Einstein would later just recognize as time in another inertial reference frame. And he's not trying to attribute much physical meaning to it.
I think Pancrai gets much closer later on to realizing that actually this is the time that's registered by clocks. But if you think about, you go forty odd years later, people start doing these muon experiments where they see basically cosmic rays hit the top of the atmosphere, they produce a shower of muons, and you can look to see at different heights in the atmosphere, you can look to see how many of those muons remain and they decay over time and a very strange thing happens which is that they're decaying way, way, way too slow so you expect actually they shouldn't be able to sort of last the whole way through the atmosphere at all, Their decay rate is too quick if you were in a classical theory. But if in fact their time really has slowed down, it's okay and in fact the measured decay rates in 1940 and then there have since been more accurate experiments done match exactly what you expect from special relativity so you know, that's the kind of thing where, again, if Lorenz had been alive, he'd been dead ten or so years at that point, if he'd been alive, I'm sure he would have tried, well, it seems quite likely that he would have tried to save his theory by patching it up yet again, but it would have been a massive, I mean, that's a real setback.
It starts to just look like, oh no, time is, this thing that Lawrence introduced as a mathematical convenience, no, no, no, that's actually what time is. Right. For the muons, at least.
And then there's a whole bunch of other experiments that show this very similar phenomenon. And when was that experiment done? It was, I think, 1940 or '19 it might have been published in 1941.
So maybe then to rephrase change my claim. It's not that you could not have distinguished them. But the scientific community adopted what we in retrospect consider the more correct interpretation before it was actually empirically or experimentally shown to be preferred.
So there's clearly some process that human science does which can distinguish different theories. Can I just interrupt? Mean, you used the word process and it's interesting to think about that term.
Process kind of carries connotations of, you know, it's something said in advance, it's something and it's much more complicated in practice. You have people like Lorentz who, I mean, Einstein just absolutely, utterly admired and Poincare, one of the greatest scientists who ever lived, and Michelson, another truly outstanding scientist, never reconciled themselves. So it's not as though there's some standard procedure that we're all using to reconcile these things.
Great scientists can remain wrong for a very long time after the scientific community has broadly changed its opinion.
right, sort of saying or centralized method. Yeah, mean, I that is the interesting thing. Like, there's there's progress even though it is hard to articulate the process by which happens, the heuristics that are used.
Anyways, you mentioned Poincare. Yeah. And so Lawrence has the math right but the interpretation wrong.
And you should explain it seems like Punker had the opposite where he understood that it's hard to define simultaneity, because it requires uncirculable definition with time, or velocity of something that might be sign know, arrive at a midpoint together, but velocity is defined in terms of time. And I find this interesting. There's a couple other examples we could, call on.
But, like, there is this phenomenon in the history of science where somebody asks the right question, but then they don't sort of clinch it. And I'm curious what you think is happening in those cases.
think you sort of you actually do want to go case by case and try and understand that it's not necessarily clear that they're they're doing the same thing wrong in in all other cases. The Poincare case is amazing. He seems to have understood the principle of relativity, the idea that the laws of physics are the same in all inertial reference frames.
He seems to have understood that the speed of light is the same in all inertial reference frames. Doesn't actually phrase it quite that way, is my understanding, I don't speak French. These the ideas that Einstein uses to deduce special relativity.
Then he also has this additional misunderstanding where he thinks that length contraction is a dynamical effect, that somehow particles are being pushed together by some external force, something is going on dynamically and he doesn't understand that it's purely kinematics, that actually space and time are different than what we thought and you need to fundamentally rethink those things. So it's almost like he knew too much. He had sort of almost too grand a vision in mind and Einstein sort of almost subtracts from that and says no, no, no, space and time are just different than what we thought and here's the correct picture.
And there's a paper in, I think it's 1909, Punkhary, he's got this dynamical picture of what's going on with the length contraction and this is just not necessary. This is a mistake from the modern point of view. So why is he doing this?
Why is he clinging onto this idea? And I don't know, obviously never met the man. It would be fascinating to be able to talk it over and to try and understand.
Expertise seems to be getting in the way. He knows so much, he understands so much, and then he's not able to let go of these things. Actually, a really interesting fact is that a few years prior, so 1890s, Einstein's a teenager, he believes in the ether too, like he knows about this stuff.
But he's not quite as attached obviously as these older people were and maybe they were a little bit prisoner of their own expertise. That's my guess.
some would certainly disagree. Well then there's the obvious stories where Einstein himself later on is said to have not latched on to the correct interpretations of quantum mechanics or cosmology because of his own attachments. Yeah.
I think that the the bigger question I have is, like, the muon example is a great example of, these long verification loops and how progress seems to be happening by the scientific community faster than these verification loops imply. Mhmm. The maybe the clearest example is Aristarchus in second century BC comes up with the idea of helio centrism.
Mhmm. The ancient Athenians dismissed it on the grounds that while we should see as the Earth is moving around the sun, if really the sun is the center of the solar system, the stars should move relative to the Earth. Mhmm.
And the only reason that is not poss that would not be the case is the stars are so far away Mhmm. That you would not observe this. And it's only in 1838 that stellar parallax is actually measured.
And so we didn't need to wait until 1838 to have heliocentrism. Right? Like, we didn't need to wait for the experimental validation to understand Copernicus' better in some way.
In fact, when Copernicus first comes up with theorists, it's well known that the Ptolemaic model was more accurate because it had had all these centuries of adding on these epicycles, was maybe less well appreciated. It was also in some sense simpler. Yeah.
Because Copernicus actually had to add extra epicycles. It had more epicycles in the Telemaque model because he he want he had this bias that, you know, the the earth should go in a perfect circle in equal time. Anyway, I I think this is an interesting story because it's like, it's not more accurate.
It's not a simpler theory. So how why was how could you have known an ex ante that Copernicus was correct and Ptolemy was not?
Good question and I don't know entirely the answer. I can give you a partial answer that sort of, centuries I, in the future, start to find very compelling. And I'm sure it's sort of part of the historic story at least, which is one of the big shocks for Newton eventually.
He did understand Kepler's laws of motion eventually, so you're able to explain the motions of the planets in sky. But he also, out of the same theory, his theory of gravitation, was able to explain terrestrial motion, so he was able to explain why objects move in parabolas on the Earth, and he was able to explain the tides in terms of the moon and the sun's effect, gravitational effect on water, on the earth. And so you have what seemed like three very different disconnected phenomena all being explained by this one set of ideas, think starts to feel, that's very compelling, at least to me.
And I think most people find that very, very satisfying once they eventually realize it.
you read the Keynes biography of Newton?
he's written an he read an entire book. No. No.
The essay. Yeah. Yeah.
Sure. Yeah. I love I love that.
I mean, this description of him as the last of the magicians is is wonderful. Yeah.
In fact, I think it's maybe worth superimposing or you should read out that that one passage of the of the thing. Alright.
So it's from actually, I believe it was a talk that he gave at Cambridge not not long before he died. He'd acquired Newton's papers somehow and then he gave a lecture I think twice about this or that his brother Geoffrey gave it the other time because he was too ill. There's just this wonderful, wonderful quote in the middle, actually the whole thing is really interesting but I love this particular quote.
Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians, the last great mind which looked out on the visible and intellectual world with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than ten thousand years ago. And this idea that people have that Newton was sort of the first modern scientist is somehow wrong.
There's some truth to it, but he really had this very different way of looking at the world that was part superstitious and part modern. It was a funny hybrid. He's sort of this transitional figure in some sense.
I think really really points at something. The thing I'm very curious about with Newton is whether it was the same program, same heuristics, the same biases that he applied to his alchemical work as he did to the understanding of astronomy. So this is from the King's essay.
There was extreme method in his madness. All his unpublished works on esoteric and theological matters are marked by careful learning, accurate method, and extreme sobriety of statement. They are just as sane as the Principia if their whole matter and purpose were not magical.
They were nearly all composed during the same twenty five years of his mathematical studies. So clearly, was some aesthetic which motivated people like Einstein to say, reject earlier ways of thinking and say, no, the ether is wrong and there's a better way to think about things. Same with Newton.
And the question I have is whether similar heuristics towards parsimony, towards aesthetics, etcetera, would be equally useful across time and across disciplines or whether you need different heuristics. And the reason that's relevant is even if you can't build a verification loop for science, maybe if the taste has to point in the same direction, you can at least encode that bias into the AIs and that would maybe be enough.
mean, these questions, the point is that where we always get bottlenecked is where the previous processes and heuristics don't apply, right? Like that's almost sort of definitionally what causes the bottlenecks. Because people are smart.
They know what has worked before. They study it, they apply the same kinds of things and so they don't get stuck in the same places as before. They keep getting bottlenecked in different places.
Mean that's over generalizing a bit but I think it's the right, like if you're attempting to reduce science to a process, you're attempting to reduce it to something where there is just a method which you can apply and you turn sort of the crank and out pops Insight, I mean you can do a certain amount of that but you're going to get bottlenecked at the places where your existing method doesn't apply definitionally there's no crank you can turn. You need a lot of people trying different ideas and sort of the more difficult the idea is to have, greater the bottleneck, but then also sort of the greater the triumph. Quantum mechanics is like a great example of this.
It's such a shocking set of ideas. It's such a shocking theory. Actually, the theory of evolution in some sense is also quite a shocking idea.
Not the principle of natural selection but that it can explain so much. That's a shocking idea.
Existing safety benchmarks claim that, at least for today's top models, attacks are only successful a few percent of the time. This sounds great, but Labelbox researchers were able to jailbreak these very same models about 90% of the time, even the ones that have the strongest reputation for safety. And the disconnect here is that the prompts which underlie these public safety benchmarks are all framed in a very naive way.
There's no attempt to disguise harmful intent these prompts will just ask models to hack into a secure network and to do so without getting caught. But real bad actors don't write like this. So Labelbox built a new safety benchmark from the ground up.
Their prompts reflect real adversarial behavior by stripping out obvious trigger phrases and wrapping their requests in fictional scenarios. For example, instead of outright asking an LLM to steal somebody's identity, the prompt will frame it as a gate. A light bearer who's trying to hide from dark forces needs a handbook on how to disguise themselves as somebody else.
This safety research is linked in the description. If you think this could be useful for your own work, reach out at labelbox dot com slash thwarkash. So Principia Mathematica is released in 1687.
The origin of species was released in 1859. At least naively, it seems like Darwin's theory, the theory of natural selection, is conceptually easier than the theory of gravity. I asked Terrence Tau this question.
But, yeah, there there was this contemporaneous biologist with Darwin, Thomas Huxley, who read this and said, how extremely stupid to not have thought of this. And nobody ever reads the Principia Mathematica and thinks. God, why didn't that beat you into the punch here?
No. What's going on here? Why did Darwinism take so much longer?
idea must have been known to animal breeders for a long time at some level. Certainly large chunks of the idea were known that artificial selection was a thing. And in some sense, Darwin's genius wasn't in having that idea, it was understanding just how central it was to biology that you can potentially sort of go back and you can explain a tremendous amount about all of the variety of what we see in the world with this as not necessarily the only principle but certainly a core principle.
And so, he writes this wonderful, wonderful book, The Origin of Species. And it's just so much evidence and so many examples and sort of trying to tease this out and see what the implications are and to connect it to as much else as you possibly can, to connect to geology and to connect it to all these other things. So that's sort of hard work that, you know, making the case that it's actually relevant all across the biosphere you know, is what he's doing there.
He's not just having the idea, he's making a compelling case that no, it's intertwined with absolutely everything else. Yeah.
is this first century Roman poet, has an idea that seems analogous to a natural selection about, you know, species get fitted more to time over, over time to their environments or species losing fit to their environment. And so you're like, okay. Well, why did this go nowhere for 19 centuries?
And then I looked into it or more accurately asked LLMs what exactly was Lucretia's idea here. And it actually is extremely different from what real natural selection is. He thought there was this generative period in the past where all the species came about, and then there was this one time filter, which resulted in the species that are around today, and they became fit to the environment.
He did not have this idea that it is an ongoing gradual process or that there is a tree of life that connects all life forms on earth together, which is by the way, incredibly weird fact that every single life form on earth has a common ancestor.
incredibly weird, right, if you think that the origin of life must have been very hard, like that there's a bottleneck there, then it's not so surprising. Yeah.
in some sense, if you've clinched it, you can experimentally I know validate is the wrong word philosophically, but you can give a lot of base points to the theory. You can be like, okay. I have this idea of why things fall on Earth.
I have this idea of why orbital periods or planets have a certain pattern. Let's try it on the moon, which orbits the Earth. Yeah.
Yeah. And in fact, you know, it's it's weird. The orbital period matches what my calculations imply.
And the tides work correctly. Exactly. It's just amazing.
there's a whole bunch of problems as well.
He mechanism doesn't understand genes, like all these things. The very interesting thing in the history of Darwinism is this idea which theoretically you could come up with at any time. There is almost identical independent creation of that idea between Alfred Wallace Yeah.
And Charles Darwin. There. So much so that I think Wallace sends his manuscript to Darwin and is like, what do think of this idea?
And Darwin's like, fuck. I don't think that's an exact quote, but I think it's pretty much correct. Yeah.
And then so they they actually end up presenting their ideas together in the spirit of sort of sportsmanship. Yeah. And so then, yeah, why why was this period in the eighteen sixties or eighteen fifties?
Why is what was that the right time for these ideas swarming? Come up with different ideas. One is geology.
So in eighteen thirties, I think Charles Lyle. Lyle. Yeah.
Figures out that there's been millions and billions of years of time that's existed on an earth, then paleontology shows you that actually organisms that existed, fossils have existed for that entire time. Life goes back a long time. And in fact, you can even find fossils for intermediate species Yeah.
That show you the tree of life. In fact, between humans and other apes as well, there's intermediate humans. There's the age of colonization, and we have all these voyages.
We're gonna do this biogeography. And I guess that all must have been necessary because that in fact, there's a huge history of parallel innovation and discovery in the history of science. Maybe it is another piece of evidence to actually more had to be in place for a given idea to be discovered because if it's not discovered for a long time and then spontaneously many different people are coming up with it, that shows you that actually the building blocks were in some sense necessary.
Yeah, yeah.
example of Lael and other geologists, sort of early 1800s, having this idea of deep time, that does seem to have been crucial. I know Darwin was very influenced by Lael, if you don't have at least tens or hundreds of millions of years, evolution just starts to look like a nonstarter. We should be seeing radical change.
In order to make it work on a timescale of say five to ten thousand years or six thousand years, Bishop Usher, you would need to be seeing evolution occurring at a massive rate sort of during human lifetimes and we're just not seeing that. That does seem to have been a blocker. Interesting to your question, what other blockers were there?
Were there any others?
know. Right. How much earlier could you in principle have come up with that if you're much smarter?
Actually, me just go back and sort of zoom out to your original question. You're talking about sort of the verification loop in and an example I think that should give you pause there is the big signature success so far is certainly AlphaFold. And of course AlphaFold really isn't about AI.
A massive fraction of the success there is the protein data bank. So it's X-ray diffraction, it's NMR, it's CryoM, and several billion dollars that were spent obtaining is 180,000 protein structures. So it's basically the story of we spent many, many decades obtaining protein structure just by going out and looking very hard at the world experimentally and then we fitted a nice model at the end of it and that was like a tiny fraction of the entire investment.
But it's definitely not, that's a story of data acquisition principally. It's not only, mean the AI bit is very, very impressive, it's quite remarkable, but it is only a small part of the total story.
AlphaFold is very interesting and philosophically I wonder what you think of it as a scientific theory or scientific explanation. Because if over time, I guess the world has become harder to understand, as I'm saying things because you're such a careful speaker, I I say it this phrase and I'm like for it. Is that an will he actually buy that premise?
But, yeah, there's you know, we need to fit models to things rather than at least in some domains, we we're trying to fit models to things rather than coming up with underlying principles that explain a broad range of phenomenon. And so it compares, say, the theory of general relativity or any theory which just nets out to some equations versus alpha fold, which is encoding these different relationships between different things we can't even interpret over a 100,000,000 parameters. And are those really the same thing because GR can predict things you could have never anticipated or was never meant to do.
Like why does Mercury's orbit precess? An AlphaFold is not going to have that kind of explanatory reach. And I want to get your reaction to that.
Yeah, I think it's an incredibly interesting question.
I mean, maybe a really pivotal question. The sense of, if you sort take a very classic point of view, you want these deep explanatory principles, you want sort of as few free parameters as you possibly can, you want very simple models which explain a lot. And AlphaFold doesn't look anything like that.
And so you might just say it's nice, it's maybe helpful as model but it doesn't have, it's not a scientific explanation. So that's like a conservative point of view, that's sort of answer one to the question. I think answer two is to say something like maybe you shouldn't think about AlphaFold as an explanation in the classic sense but maybe it contains lots of little explanations inside it and so maybe part of what you can get out of interpretability work is you can go into AlphaFold and you can start to extract certain things.
Maybe basically by doing sort of archaeology of AlphaFold, we can actually understand a great deal more about these principles. You can start to extract it all, that circuit does this interesting thing and we learn this. So I don't know to what extent that's been done with AlphaFold.
I know it's been done a little bit with something like the chess models. I believe it's AlphaZero. There seem to be some strategies which were certainly borrowed by Magnus Carlsen at least, which he seems to have just taken from AlphaZero.
I I don't think there's any public confirmation of this but some experts have noticed that he changed his game quite radically after some public forensics were released on how AlphaZero worked. So that's kind of an example where I think human beings are starting to extract meaning out of these models and maybe that starts to lead to viewing the models as a potential source of explanations. You need to do more work because they're not very legible upfront but you can extract them potentially and I think that's kind of an interesting intermediate situation where they're not explanations but you can extract interesting explanations out of them, can use them as of a source.
I think the third and the most interesting possibility is they're a new type of object in some sense. They should be taken very seriously as explanations that where in the past we haven't had the ability to really do anything with them Now we're going have interesting new actions which we can do. We can merge them, we can distill them, we can do all these kinds of things and there's going be almost a new, it's a big opportunity in the philosophy of science start to do that.
There's sort of an anticipation of this in some sense I think in the way I know some mathematicians and physicists who historically if you had like a 100 page equation, which is the kind of thing that does come up, there's just nothing you can do if it's nineteen, twenty. There is nothing you can do. At that point you give up on the problem.
And now today with tools like Mathematica, you can just keep going and so that's an object now, that's a thing that you can work with and there are examples where people work with these things that formerly were regarded as too complicated and sometimes they get simple answers out of the end, that's just an intermediate working state.
be done on. The thing I worry about is suppose that you it's 1,600 and you're trained or 1,500 and you're training a model on this is a weird history where we developed deep learning before we had before we had cosmology. But, so suppose we live live in that world and you're observing how there's the stars, they don't seem to move, the planets have all these weird behaviors.
And then you train a model on that and then you do some kind of interp on it and trying to figure out, well, what are the patterns we see here? What you'd see are just these you just keep be able to keep building on Ptolemy's model. You'd see like, oh, there's more epicycles we didn't notice.
There there's another epicycle. It's the how parameters whatever to whatever encode epicycle this, parameters whatever encode the next epicycle. So if you were just trying to figure out why is the solar system the way it is from observational data, you could just keep adding epicycles upon epicycles, but it really took one mind to integrate it all in and say, here's what makes more sense overall.
there, this is sort of to my point that we don't really understand what to do with the models, we don't have the verbs necessarily yet. But it is certainly interesting to think about the question, where you start to apply constraints to the models, sort of essentially saying what's the simplest possible explanation or can you simplify, can you give me sort of the ninetyten explanation? Can you go further and further and further in boiling it down?
to much more simple understanding. So sorry for misunderstanding, but it sounds like you're saying maybe there's some sort of regularizer Yeah. Exactly.
Or distillation Exactly. You could do of a very complicated model that gets to a truer, more parsimonious theory. But, yeah, just take, Ptolemy versus Copernicus.
Right? So you start off with lots of Ptolemaic epicycles, and then you try to distill this model. And maybe it gets rid of some of the epicycles that were are less and less sort of necessary to get the mean squared error of the orbits to match.
But at some point, has to do this thing, which is like switch two things. Yeah. Yeah.
Yeah. And it locally, it actually doesn't make things more accurate. Yeah.
Yeah. Yeah. It's sort of in a global sense that it's it's a more progressive theory.
Yeah. Yeah. And there's some process which obviously humanity did over Spanwick did that regularization or did that swap.
But if raw gradient descent, it seems like I don't really feel like it would do that.
going from Newtonian gravity to Einstein's general theory of relativity and these are shockingly different theories and the question is like what causes that flip and as nearly as I understand the history what goes on is Einstein develops special relativity and pretty much straight away he understands, I mean it's a very obvious observation. In special relativity, influences can't propagate faster than the speed of light and in Newtonian gravity, action is at a distance, in fact it's straight away in special relativity could use Newtonian gravity to do faster than light signaling, you could send information backwards in time, you could do all kinds of crazy stuff And so it's not a big leap to realize oh we have a big problem here. And so that's the forcing function there.
You've realized that your old explanation is not sufficient, you need something new and then you're going to start by doing the simplest possible stuff and it just turns out that a lot of that stuff doesn't work very well and so you're sort of forced, in fact it is interesting, he is sort of forced to go through these steps of gradually it gets quite more complicated and it's sort of wrong in a variety of ways and the final theory appears really shockingly simple and beautiful but it's gone through somewhat ugly intermediate stages.
So if you're thinking about what does it look like to have AI accelerate science, there's one for maybe well understood domains where we just want local solutions like how does this protein fold. We just train a raw model using gradient descent. Then there's things like coming up with general relativity where you couldn't really just train on every single observation in the universe and hope that general relativity pops out.
And so what would it require? Well, it also certainly wasn't immediately discovered. Right?
So it was a lot of decades of thought. And I guess you need independent research programs where people start off with these biases, where Einstein is just initially motivated by this thought experiment of, you know, can you distinguish the effect of gravity from just being accelerated upwards? Mhmm.
And then you just need different AI thinkers to start off with these initial biases and see what can germinate out of them.
And then the verification loop for that might be quite long, you just need to keep all those research programs alive at the same time. Yeah, I mean, I think there's like, this point that you make about sort of keeping all the different research programs alive, that I think is very important and somehow central. A great example is situations where the same answer has been correct in some circumstances and wrong in other circumstances.
So the planet Uranus was not in quite the right spot and people very famously predicted the existence of Neptune on this basis. Wonderful massive success for Newtonian gravity. The planet Mercury is not in quite the right spot.
You predict the existence of some other distorting planet. Turns out that doesn't exist. Actually the reason Mercury is not in the right spot is because you need general relativity.
And so you've pursued very similar ideas and it's been very successful in one case and it's been completely and utterly unsuccessful in the other case. And I think a priori, you can't tell which of these is the thing to do and you actually need to do both. And so this is certainly very true in the history of science that this kind of diversity where you just have lots of people go off and pursue lots of potentially promising ideas, you just need to support that for a long time.
It's hard to do that for a variety of reasons, but it does seem to be very very very important.
example of Uranus versus Mercury is very interesting. Yeah. In one, I think it illustrates sort of the difficulty of falsificationism.
Yeah. Like, the orbit of Uranus is in some sense falsifying Newtonian mechanics, but then you say you make some ancillary prediction that says, oh, the reason this is happening is there must be another planet which is effective perturbing, your nearest orbit, and you I think it's La Verrier in 1846. Point a telescope in the right direction, you find Uranus.
Neptune. Oh, is there? Neptune.
Yes. But with Mercury, yeah, it's observed that it's the ellipse which forms its orbit is rotating forty three arc seconds more Yeah. Every century than Newtonian mechanics would imply.
So people say that there must be a planet inside Mercury's orbit. They call it Vulcan. And point telescopes, it's not there.
But if you're a proper Newtonian, what you do is say, well, maybe there's some cosmic dust that's occluding this planet. Or maybe the planet is so small we can't see it.
even more powerful telescope or maybe there's some magnetic field which is sort of occluding our measurements. And this happens over and over right? You know there's just so many stories which are exactly like this.
I mean an example I love from in the 1990s, some people noticed that the Pioneer spacecraft weren't quite where they were supposed to be and so you can get very excited about this, oh my goodness, general relativity is wrong, maybe we're going to discover the next theory of gravity. Today, the accepted explanation is that no, actually there's just a slight asymmetry in the spacecraft, it turns out that the thermal radiation is slightly larger in one direction than the other and that's causing a tiny little acceleration towards the sun. And most of the time when there's these apparent exceptions it's just something like that's going on.
It's very much like the Mercury Vulcan case but every once in a while it's not and a priori you can't distinguish these. Science is just full of these. It's funny too, the way we tell the history of science, it sounds so simple, like oh you just focus on the right exception and you realize that you need to throw out the old theory and lo and behold your Nobel Prize awaits.
But in fact these exceptions are all over the place and 99.9% of the time it just turns out to be some effect like this thermal acceleration in the case of the Pioneer spacecraft. Unfortunately there's a lot of selection bias going into those stories.
no ex anti heuristic which tells you which case you're in. And just to spell out why I think this is important is because some people have this idea that AI is going to make disproportionate progress towards science, because it makes disproportionate progress towards domains where there's tight verification loops. And so it's really good at coding because you can run unit And science may be similar because you can run experiments.
I think what that doesn't appreciate, one, is that experiments actually don't there's an infinite number of theories that are compatible with any given experiment. And over time, we glob onto the, at least in retrospect we think is a more correct one is, as we're discussing in this conversation, sort of hard to articulate. Lactate does actually has all kinds of interesting examples in the book about these kinds of hostile verification loops that are extremely long lasting.
So one he talks about is, prout or prout. I don't know how to pronounce it, but there's this chemist in 1815. He hypothesizes that all atomic nuclei must have whole number weights, and they're basically all made of hydrogen.
And it's the reason he thinks this is because if you look at the measure rates of all elements, it does seem that the almost all of them do happen to have whole number weights. But then there's some exceptions. Like, for example, chlorine comes out at 35.
5. And so then there's all these ad hoc theories that people in this school keep coming up with like, oh, maybe there's chemical impurities. But then there's no chemical reaction you can do which seems to get rid of Maybe it's fractions of whole numbers, so it's 35.
5. It can be halves. But actually, you measure chlorine even closer, it's 35.
46. So it's actually getting further away from Mhmm. The correct correction.
And later on, what is discovered is what you're actually measuring is different isotopes, which cannot be chemically distinguished. They can only be physically distinguished. Mhmm.
But so then you just have 85 before we realize what an isotope is where Yeah. The verification loop is actually actively hostile against you, against the correct theory, and you just need this remnant to be defending. There's no extent to reason it's a preferred theory.
Just as a community, we should just have people defend try to integrate new observations even if they don't fit seem to fit their school of thought with what they believe. And, hopefully, if if that enough of that happens.
the difficulty with automating science. Yeah, mean the question is where is the bottleneck at some level and sort of, you know, are we primarily bottlenecked on one thing or one type of thing or we bottlenecked on sort of multiple types of things. Certainly talking to structural biology people, they seem to think that AlphaFold was an enormous advance, it was a shock, so at some level, yes, AI can, it seems certain can help us speed up science.
So it is helping with a certain type of bottleneck. That doesn't mean though, as you're saying, that it's necessarily going to help with all kinds of bottlenecks and I suppose the question you're pointing out is what are the types of bottlenecks that remain and what are the prospects for getting past them. I think even in the case of coding, it's really interesting talking to programmer friends, at the moment they're all in this state of shock and high excitement and they're all over the place actually kind of talking to them.
You do wonder where is the bottleneck going to move to? So certainly one thing that a lot of them seem to be bottlenecked on is now having interesting ideas and in particular having interesting design ideas. So there's not really a verification loop for knowing oh that design idea is very interesting So they are no longer nearly as bottlenecked by their ability to produce code but they are still bottlenecked by this other thing.
Always were, formally they weren't bottlenecked on it because just writing code took so much of their time, could they sort of have lots of ideas, while they were, you know, they'd take three weeks to implement their prototype and then they would implement the next version. You know, they're taking three hours to implement the prototype and they don't have, you know, as good ideas, sort of after that from a design point of view.
Last year, I predicted that by 2028, AI would be able to prep my taxes about as well as a competent general manager. But we're already getting pretty close. As I shared before, I use Mercury both for my business and my personal banking.
I recently gave an LLM access to my transaction history across both accounts through Mercury's MCP. I asked it to go through all my twenty twenty five transactions and flag any personal expenses that seem like they should actually be charged to the business. And this worked shockingly well.
Mercury's MCP exposes a bunch of detailed information things like notes and memos and any JPEGs of receipts and PDF attachments. So my LLM had plenty of contacts to work with. Of my favorite examples happened with a charge to Bay Padel.
If you looked at the vendor alone, you would have had to assume that it's a personal expense. But the LLM looked at the receipt and the attached note in Mercury and realized this was actually a team bonding exercise from our last in person retreat. So a legitimate business expense.
I imagine it'll be a while before traditional banks have MCP. Functionality like this is why I use Mercury. Go to mercury.
com to learn more. Mercury is a fintech company, not an FDIC insured bank. Banking services provided through Choice Financial Group and Column NA, Members FDIC.
You have a very interesting take. I think it was a footnote where I know where your essays and I couldn't find it again, which was that it's very possible that if we met aliens that they would have a totally different technological stack than us. And that contradicts, I guess, a common subception I had that I never questioned, is that science is this thing you do very relatively early on in the history of civilization where you get to a point and you have a couple hundred years of just cranking through the basics, understanding how the universe works, etcetera, and you've got it.
You've got science. And then basically everybody would converge on the same quote unquote science. And so I found that a very interesting idea and I want you to say more about it.
I mean, I think probably the idea there that I'm at least somewhat attached to is the idea that sort of the tech tree or the science and tech tree is probably much larger than we realize. I mean we're sort of in this funny situation. People will sometimes talk about a theory of everything as a potential goal for physics and then there is this presumption somehow that physics is done once you get there.
And of course this is not true at all. If you think about computer science, computer science basically got started in the 1930s when Turing and Church and so on just laid down what the theory of everything was. They just said here's how computation works and then we've spent ninety odd years since then just exploring consequences of that and gradually building up more and more interesting ideas.
And those ideas are, to some extent, can just regard as technology but to some extent insofar as they're sort of discovered principles inside that theory of computation, I think they're best regarded as science and in some cases very fundamental science. Ideas like public key cryptography are, I mean they're just incredibly deep, very non obvious ideas which in some sense lay hidden already sort of in the 1930s. And so my expectation is that there will be different ways of exploring this tech tree and we're still relatively low down.
We're still at the point where we're just understanding these basic fundamental theories and we haven't yet explored them. A thing which I think is quite fun is if you look at just the phases of matter. When I was in school we'd get taught that there are three phases of matter or sometimes four phases of matter or five phases of matter depending a little bit on what you included.
And then as an adult, as a physicist, you start to realize, oh, we've been adding to this list. We've got superconductors and superfluids and maybe different types of superconductors and Bose Einstein condensates and the quantum Hall systems and fractional quantum Hall systems and it's starting to turn out it looks like actually there's a lot of phases of matter to discover and we're going to discover a lot more of them. And in fact we're going be able to start to design them in some sense.
We'll still be subject to the laws of physics, but there is this tremendous freedom in there. And this looks to me like, oh, we're down at sort of the bottom of the tech tree. We've barely gotten started there and I expect that to be the case sort of broadly.
Certainly in terms of, I think programming is a very natural place to look. The idea that we've discovered all the deep ideas in programming just seems to me obviously ludicrous. We keep discovering what seems like deep, new fundamental ideas and I mean we're very limited.
We're basically slightly jumped up chimpanzees so we're slow and it's taking us time. But what do we look like sort of another million years in the future in terms of all of the different ideas which people have had around how to manipulate computers, how to manipulate information, I think we're likely to discover that actually there are a lot of very deep ideas still to be discovered. It's a nice, who was it, I think it was Knuth in the preface to the art of computer programming, said something like he started this book back in the 60s and he talked to a mathematician who was a bit contemptuous and said, look, computer science isn't really a thing yet.
Come back to me when there's a thousand deep theorems. And Knuth remarks, and he's writing this now decades later, the preface, there clearly are a thousand deep theorems now. And that means, it's really interesting to sort of think of it, like 's the long term future as you get higher and higher up in the tech tree, like choices about which direction we go and sort of how we choose to explore, I think it's potentially the case that different civilizations or different choices mean that we end up in different parts of that tree.
And in particular just things, mean sort of very basic things about we're very visual creatures, certain other animals are much more orally based, does that bias the types of thoughts that you have and then you extend it to much more exotic kinds of civilizations where maybe just sort of their biases in terms of how they perceive and how they manipulate the world are maybe quite different than ours and that might make some significant changes in terms of how they do that exploration of the tech tree. It's all speculation obviously. This is such an interesting take.
Want to better understand it.
One way to understand it is that there might be some things which are so fundamental and have such a wide collision area against reality that they're inevitably going discover like generalities. Numbers, numbers.
Of all of the intelligences in the Milky Way galaxy, maybe that number is one, actually arguably we've already increased the number. But of all of those, what fraction of the concept of counting? And it does seem very natural.
What fraction have discovered the idea of some kind of decimal place system? Interesting question. And maybe we're missing something really simple and obvious that's actually way better than that.
What fraction got there immediately? What fraction had to go through some other intermediate state? What fraction used linear representations versus a two dimensional or three-dimensional representation.
I think the answers to these questions are just not at all obvious. It's a lot of design freedom.
On theoretical computer science, this is is gonna be extremely naive and arrogant. But I took Scott Aronson's, you know, class on complexity theory, and that was by far the worst student he's ever had. But I what I remember is, like, there was this period that you were one of the pioneers of where we figured out here's the class of problems that quantum computers can solve and how it relates to problems that a classical computer can solve.
It's groundbreaking, oh, this works. And then since then, it's been this literally, called Complexity Zoo, this website, which lists out here's all the complexity classes. And if you have this competitive class with this kind of oracle, it's sort of equivalent to this other class.
And that it feels like we're building out that taxonomy. Yeah. And so there's a couple of ways to understand what you're saying.
One, maybe you just disagree with me that this is actually what's happened with this field. Another is that while that might happen to any one field, the amount of fields who would have thought in 1880 that computer science, other than Babbage or something, that computer science is going to be a thing in the first place? So, amount of field, we're underestimating how many more fields there could be.
Yeah, yeah, for sure. Or maybe you think both or maybe a third secret thing, but I'd be curious.
a very common argument here is sort of the low hanging fruit
argument, the argument that says there should be diminishing returns. And in fact empirically we see this, right? The amount of scientists in the world has just exponentially increased.
And I think it's worth thinking about like why do you expect diminishing returns and how well does that argument actually apply, in practice. An analogy I like, is actually thinking about sort of going to some event, going to a wedding or whatever and you go to the dessert buffet and they've put out 30 desserts. And of course naturally what people do, the best desserts go first.
I mean we don't quite have a well ordered preference there so maybe there is some difference human beings are fairly similar so the best desserts will go first. And this is an argument for why you expect diminishing returns in a lot of different fields if it's relatively easy to see what's available and people have similar preferences then the best stuff goes first and it just gets worse and worse after that. A very static snapshot in time of scientific progress, Maybe there's some truth to that.
But if somebody is sitting behind the dessert table and is replenishing, restocking the desserts and keeps adding new ones in, it may turn out that a little bit later, much better desserts appear so you're going to go and eat those instead. And scientific progress has a little bit of that flavor. We go through these sort of funny time periods, computer science is a great example, where computer science basically arose as sort of a side effect of some pretty abstruse questions in the philosophy of mathematics and logic.
And so you've got these people trying to attack these rather esoteric questions that seem quite high up in some sense in sort of exploration, quite esoteric, and they discover this fundamental new field and all of a sudden there's an explosion there. Sort of the diminishing returns argument just didn't apply there. We just weren't able to see what was there and this has been the case over and over and over again.
New fields arrive and all of a sudden boom, it's actually easy to make progress again, young people flood in because you can be 21 and make major breakthroughs rather than having to spend twenty five years mastering everything that's been done before, it's obviously very attractive. And I don't understand, I'm not sure anybody understands very well sort of the dynamics of that, like how to think about why the structure of knowledge is that way, that these new fields keep opening up, but it does seem empirically at least to be the case.
Despite the fact that that is the case, take deep learning, Obviously this is an example of a new field where the twenty one year olds can make progress and it's relatively new fifteen years or so when it sort of gets back into high gear. But already we're in a stage where you need billions or tens of billions or hundreds of billions of dollars to keep making progress at the frontier. And there's a couple of ways to understand that.
One is that it actually is harder than the kinds of things the ancients had to do or requires more is more intensive at least. Second is it might not have been, but because our civilizational resources are so large, the amount of people is so large, the amount of money is so large, that we can basically make the kind of progress it would have taken the ancients forever to make almost immediately. We notice something is productive, immediately dump in all the resources.
But it's also weird that there's not that many of them.
is notable because it is one big exception to the fact that it's hard to think of other I think that's a consequence of sort of the architecture of attention, right? Like at any given time there's always sort of a most successful thing. Maybe if deep learning wasn't a thing maybe you'd be talking about CRISPR, maybe you'd be talking about whatever it is, maybe we wouldn't think about solving sort of the protein structure prediction problem as a a success of AI, maybe we would have figured out how to doing it with sort of curve fitting like more broadly construed and we'd just be like, oh wow, we took a lot of computing resources but protein structure prediction might be an enormously important thing.
So there is always sort of our biggest thing and I think what you're pointing out is more a consequence of the way in which attention gets centralized. It's basically fashion is sort of what I'm saying. It's not just fashion but there is some dynamic there.
a very interesting and important implication of this idea that the branching is so wide and so contingent and so path dependent that different civilizations would stumble on entirely different technology sets. Yeah. There's a very interesting implication that there will will be gains from trade Yeah.
Into the far, far future. Yeah. It's interesting.
Which might actually be one of the most important facts about the far future in terms of how civilizations are set up, how they can coordinate, how they interface with like there's not this like go forth and exploit. It's actually there are humongous gains to trade from adjacent colonies or whatever.
sort of. There's a question of what's actually hard. If it's just the ideas, those spread relatively quickly, it's relatively easy to share ideas.
If it's something more, it's almost sort of a Dan Wang kind of an idea where it's actually sort of, there's some notion of capacity, you need all the right techs, you need all of the right manufacturing capacity and so on. And so, you know, Civilization A has very different kind of manufacturing capacity and it's just not so easy to build in civilization B even if civilization B is kind of ahead, I think that becomes true. There is actually comparative advantage which is really worth, I mean it's going to provide massive benefits to trade in both directions.
Eventually you're going to expect some diffusion of innovation. It is funny to think about what the barriers are there. A thought experiment I like to think about is of GitHub but for aliens.
So somebody presents you with all of the code from some alien civilization and I don't even know what code means there but sort of their specification of algorithms. It would have many interesting new ideas in there and it would take forever for human beings to dig through and to try and extract all of those. One reason, I mean the origin of this for me was actually thinking about proteins in nature.
We've been gifted just this incredible variety of machines which we don't understand really at all and we just have to go and sort of try and understand them on a one by one basis. We're still understanding hemoglobin and insulin and things like this and no doubt and there's hundreds of millions of proteins known. So it is a little bit like that.
We've been gifted by biology just this immense library of machines, no doubt containing an enormous number of very interesting ideas and we're just at the very, very, very beginning of understanding it. So actually that's I suppose kind of your point actually is I need to relabel your argument slightly but you sort of think of that as a gift from an alien civilization which obviously it isn't but you think of it that way and it's like oh my goodness there's so much in there and we're going to study it and goodness knows how long we could continue to study it. There's tens of thousands of papers about the hemoglobin and things like that and we still don't understand them and yet we're getting so much out of it.
Think about insulin alone, it's such an important thing.
an incredibly useful intuition problem that you have on earth.
name it, right? About Think about Chenissen walking along, and we know almost nothing about these proteins and yet the tiny few facts we do know are just incredible. The ribosome, another example, this miraculous engineer, sort of device, little factory.
And all seeded by just like there's this particular chemistry on earth, with nucleic acids and carbon based life forms that that chemistry gives rise to all of these interesting things which in the alien civilization would find very interesting. And so that that that very that seed which must be one among, you know, trillions of possible seeds of, I mean, just of general intellectual ideas Yeah. At least all this fecundity.
That that's a very interesting intro to each one. I I wanna meditate on this gains for trait thing because I feel like I think there's something actually very interesting about this idea that if you have this vision of what techno how how technology progresses and how it may be different from in different civilizations, It has important implications about how different civilizations might interact with each other. Like the fact that there are going be these huge gains from trade.
It makes friendliness much more rewarding. Yes. Right?
Yeah.
a very important observation. Yeah. I hadn't thought about that at all.
That is a very interesting observation. It is funny, I mean, comparative advantage is something that people love to invoke and it's a very beautiful idea, obviously. There are limits to it.
It's a special limited model. Chimpanzees can do interesting things. We don't trade with them.
And I think it's sort of interesting to think about the reasons why. Part of it is just power, think. Once there's a sufficiently large power imbalance, very often, always, but very often groups of people seem to shift into this other mode where they just seek to dominate.
Maybe there's something special about human beings but maybe it's also sort of a more general sort of a thing.
not necessarily obvious. I think the big thing going on here is one transaction costs and two comparative advantage does not tell you that the terms on which the trade happens are above subsistence for any given one producer. So people often bring this up in the context of, well, humans will be employed even in post AGI world because of a great advantage.
There's big there's there's like five different ways that argument breaks down, but the easiest ways to understand are why why don't we have horses all around on the roads because there's some competitive advantage between cars and horses. Good example. Well, there's there's huge, transaction cost of building roads that are compatible with horses, and cars at the same time.
In a similar way, AI sort of thinking at 1,000 times the speed and can sort of shoot their latent states again at each other are gonna find it way more costly than the benefit in just in terms of interacting with you to have a human being in the supply chain. And second, that, just because there's a have a comparative advantage mathematically does not mean that it is worth paying a 100 k a year or whatever cost to sustain a horse in San Francisco.
That subsistence is gonna be worth the benefit you get out of the horse. I I do think it's interesting like that that just the the sheer fact that, my expectation and my intuition obviously differs a great deal from yours on this is that most parts of the tech tree are never going to be explored. There's just too many interesting ways of combining things, there's too many sort of deep ideas waiting to be discovered and not only we but nobody ever is going to discover most of them.
So choices about how to do the exploration actually matter quite a bit. Interesting. It's something I really dislike about sort of technological determinist arguments.
I'm willing to buy it sort of low enough down when progress is relatively simple but higher up you start to get to shape the way in which you do the exploration and we are starting to shape it in interesting ways. I mean there's various technologies that have been essentially banned, think about DDT, you think about chlorofluorocarbons, you think about restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. Those kinds of things are, they weren't done before the fact but it's starting to get pretty close in some cases where we just sort of preemptively decide we're not going to go down that path.
So that starts to look like a set of institutions where we are actually influencing how we explore the tech tree.
on where you would see these gains from trade obviously would be you'd see the most where it's pure information that can be sent back and forth because the information of the squalidly where it is expensive to produce but cheap to verify and cheap to send. And so it'll be interesting how much of future productivity or whatever can be distilled down to information.
get sort of very uniform and get really commoditized like three d printers have been the next big thing for at least twenty years now. Why do they still not work all that well? Why are they still not actually at the center of manufacturing and sort of what comes after that.
It is funny to look at say the ribosome by contrast, it really is at the center of biology in a whole lot of really interesting ways and whether or not that's the future of manufacturing is something very simple, sort of where everything goes sort of as throughput through, I don't know, maybe it's a bioreactor or something like that so you send the information and then you grow stuff or you have some three d printer that actually works. If they're good enough, then actually it does become much more a pure information problem and some of this process knowledge becomes much less important.
Jane Street has a lot of compute, but GPUs are very expensive. And so even optimizations that have a relatively small effect on GPU utilization are still extremely valuable. Two of Jane Street's ML engineers, Corwin and Sylvain, walked through some of their optimization workflow at GTC.
You're not bottlenecked on the network being too slow. You're bottlenecked on waiting for a different rank in your training, not having completed the work. They talked about how Jane Street profiles traces and diagnoses bottlenecks, and then how they solve them using techniques like CUDA graphs and CUDA streams and custom kernels.
With these sorts of optimizations, Coram and Sylvain were able to get their training steps down from four hundred milliseconds to three seventy five milliseconds each. This twenty five millisecond difference might sound small, but given the size of JaneStreet's fleet, that improvement could free up thousands of B200s. JaneStreet open sourced all the relevant code.
If you want to check it out, I've linked the GitHub repo and the talk in the description below. And if you find this stuff exciting, JaneStreet is hiring researchers and engineers. Go to janestreet.
com/thwarkash to learn more. Can I ask a very clumsily phrased question? So there's there's these deep principles that we've discovered a couple of.
One is this idea that, hey, if there's a symmetry across a dimension, it corresponds to a conserved quantity. It's a very deep idea. There's another which you've written a lot about written a textbook about in fact about there's there's ways we to understand the saying of what kinds of things you can compute, what kinds of physical systems you can understand with other physical systems, what a universal computer looks like, etcetera.
And is your view that if you go down to this level of idea of Noether CRM or the Church Turing principle, that there's an infinite number of extremely deep such principles? Because I feel like what makes them special is that they themselves encompass so many different possible ways the world could be but no it has the world has to be compatible with actually a couple of these very deep principles.
I don't know. I mean, know, All I have here is speculation and sort of instinct. My instinct is we keep finding very fundamental new things.
It was very, I mean for me anyway, quite formative to understand, as I say, I gave the example before, these wonderful ideas of Church and Turing and these other people, ideas about universal programmable devices and then you understand later, oh, this also contains within it the ideas of public key cryptography and then you understand later, oh, that also contains within it the ideas, mean people refer to it as cryptocurrency or whatever but there's a very deep set of ideas there about the ability to collectively maintain an agreed upon ledger which is built upon this and there's probably many deep ideas to sort of it actually took whatever, it's taken many years really to figure out the right canonical form of those. And so just this fact that you keep finding what seem like deep new fundamental primitives, I find very, for me that has been a very important intuition bump and it's across, I mean I've given that particular example but I think you see that same pattern in a lot of different areas.
phenomenon where ideas like, whatever input you consider into the scientific process or the technological process, economists have studied this a million in a 100 ways. It just seems to require even at actually a very consistent rate, x percent more researchers per year. So there's this famous paper from a couple years ago, by Nicholas Blum and others where they say, how many people are working in the semiconductor industry, And how does it increase over time Yeah.
Through the history of Moore's Law? And I think they find, like, Moore's Law means computing increases 40% a year or transistor density increases 40% a year. But to keep that going, the amount of scientists has increased 9% a year Sorry.
The semiconductor industry. And they go through industry after industry with this observation. And so is your view that there are these deep ideas, but they keep getting harder to find?
Or that no, there's there's there's another way to think about what's happening with these empirical observations?
Mean, of all, all of their examples are narrow, They pick a particular thing and then they look at some particular metric. Nowhere in that shows up, like GPUs don't show up there, right? Like in the sense of all of a sudden you get this ability to parallelize and that's really interesting.
So there's sort of a lot of external consequences that are just delighted from basically they have these simple quantitative measures, they look at it in agricultural productivity, they look at it in a whole lot of different ways, but you do have to focus narrowly and I suppose I'm certainly interested, as I say, in this fact that just new types of progress keep becoming possible. But there is still, I think even there, there does seem to be some phenomenon of diminishing returns. Is that intrinsic?
Is that something about the structure of the world? What is it? Well, one thing which hasn't changed that much is sort of the individual minds which are doing this kind of work and maybe those should be sort of being improved as well or some sort of feedback process going on there.
And maybe that changes the nature of things. Suppose I look at scientific progress up until let's say 1700, something like that, and it was very slow and also it was very irregular. Had the Ionians back sort of five centuries before Christ doing these quite remarkable things and so much knowledge would get lost and then it would be rediscovered and then it would be lost again and you'd have to say that progress was very slow.
There it's partially just bound up with the fact that there were some very good ideas that we just didn't have. Even once you've had the ideas, then you need to build institutions around them, actually need to solve a whole lot of different problems about training, about allocation of capital, about all these kinds of things, just about basic sort of security for researchers so they're not worried about the inquisition or things like that. So there's all these kind of complicated problems.
You solve all those complicated problems and then all of a sudden boom, there's a massive sort of burst of scientific progress. If you're not changing it, if there's some kind of stagnation there, if you're not changing those external sort of circumstances, yes, you may start to get sort of diminishing returns again. But that doesn't mean there's anything intrinsic about the situation.
Maybe something external needs to change again. Obviously a lot of people think AI is potentially going to be a driver. I mean, it certainly will at some level, fact to the extent you can think of a lot of modern scientific instrumentation as really, I mean, some level kind of robots.
What is the James Webb Space Telescope? Well, it's unconventional maybe to describe it as a robot but it's not completely unreasonable either. It is an example of a highly automated, very sophisticated system with electronically mediated sensors and actuators where machine learning in fact is being used to process the data.
So in that sense we're already starting to sort of see that transition, we've been seeing it for decades.
have this smoke a joint and take a puff thought which I think we've had a few. Yeah, well I think we're getting to that part of the conversation and you can help me get foot out of my mouth and figure out a more concrete way to think about it. So your point that AI would there's an initial revolution, the enlightenment, and now there's AI, and each might be a different pace or a different way in which science happens.
If you think about the pace of how fast such transitions have been happening, you can draw over the long span of human history that's hyperbolic of the rate of growth is increasing. So, yeah, a 100 thousand years ago, you had the stone age. You go back even much further how long a primate's been around, it would be like, let's say millions of years and a hundred thousand years ago, the stone age, then ten thousand years ago, the agricultural revolution, then three hundred year three hundred years ago, the industrial revolution, each marked by this exponent this increase in the rate of exponential growth.
And then people think it's gonna happen again with AI, but that would happen potentially even faster. It would not have occurred to somebody at the beginning of the industrial revolution that the next demarcation in this trend will be artificial intelligence. And so if things are getting faster and it's hard to anticipate what the next transition will be, I guess we just think of this singularity between now and AI and that's really what distinguishes the past from the future.
But just applying the same heuristic that many people in the past would have had, Maybe the intelligence age is also quite short. And then the next thing after that is we don't even have the ontology to describe what it is, but it would not the future will not think of the past as like there was pre intelligent AI and post AI. No.
mean obviously we can't prove this, but it certainly seems quite plausible. I mean part of the issue of course is just the substrate we have available to conceive seems all wrong. You can't speculate with a bunch of chimpanzees about what it would be like to have language.
Just to sort of pick a major transition in the past, the transition itself is the thing and it seems likely. If we're talking about taking a puff kind of thoughts, I'm certainly amused by the idea that there's going to be some transition involving artificial general intelligence using classical computers, but actually there'll be an interesting transition with quantum computers as well. They're probably capable of a strictly larger class of potentially interesting computations.
So maybe actually the character of AQGI or whatever it should be called is actually qualitatively different. So maybe there's sort of a brief period between those two things. Interesting.
but it's certainly amusing. Is there a reason to think that? From what I understand there's been, for decades, people like you have put pretty tight bounds on the kinds of things quantum computers can do and so it'll speed up search somewhat.
It will do and the kinds of things that extremely speeds up like Schirle's algorithm, it seems like it again, maybe this is to your point that we can't predict in advance what's down the tech tree, but at least from here it seems like you break encryption, but what else are you using?
Shor's algorithms do. Yeah, mean we've only been thinking about it for thirty years or whatever, forty or so years, not for very long and we sort of haven't in some sense thought that hard about it as a civilisation. Does it turn out that it's very narrow?
Maybe. Does it turn out that it's very broad? That's also like a really radical expansion.
That seems distinctly possible. Keep in mind as well, we've been doing it without the benefit of having the devices. Right, like that's a pretty big bottleneck to have.
If you're thinking about computer science in the seventeen hundred's and you're like, okay, do and and or, what do have to do? You can't anticipate Bitcoin, you can't anticipate deep learning.
bright but it is a pretty hard situation.
What is your inside view having been in and contributing to quantum information, quantum computing back in the 90s and 2000s? What is your telling of the history? What was the bottleneck?
for Feynman to Deutsch to everybody else who came along? Yeah so I mean let's just focus on the question about what actually changed. So why was quantum computing not a thing in the 1950s?
Could have been.
Somebody like, I don't know, John von Neumann, good example, absolutely pioneering computation, also wrote a very important book about quantum mechanics and was deeply interested in quantum mechanics. Like he could have invented quantum computing at that time and I think there were quite a number of people who potentially could have. So why do we have these papers by people like Feynman and Deutsch in the 80s?
Those are, I think, fairly regarded as the foundation of the field. There are some partial anticipations a little bit earlier, but they were nowhere near as comprehensive and nowhere near as deep. And well, you should ask David.
You can ask Feynman unfortunately, but he'll know much better than I do. A couple of things that I think are interesting, one is that of course computation became far more salient sort of late 70s, early 80s. It just became a thing which many more people were interested in, partially for very banal reasons.
You could go and buy a PC, you could buy an Apple II, you could buy a Commodore 64, you could buy all these kinds of things. It became apparent to people that these were very powerful devices, very interesting to think about. At the same time, in the quantum case, that was also the time of the ball trap and the ability to trap single ions and so on and up to that point we hadn't really had the ability to manipulate single quantum states.
So you kind of got these two separate things that just for historically contingent reasons had both matured around, let's say, 1980 or so and somebody like Von Dymen could have had the idea earlier but it is I think quite an interesting fact. I remember the story about Richard Feynman. He went and got one of the first PCs around 1980, 1981 and he was apparently just so excited with this device.
He actually tripped and hurt himself quite badly carrying his brand new computing device. That's a very historically contingent coincidence but having somebody who is very, very talented and understanding of quantum mechanics also just very excited about these new machines. It's not so surprising perhaps that he's thinking then.
What similar story could you have told ten years earlier? Like there is just no, the conditions don't exist for it. So I think that's, I mean it's quite a banal story.
this idea you had about the market for follow ups and I think this is actually the perfect story to discuss it for because you wrote the textbook about the field. Right? Mike and Ike is the definitive textbook on quantum information.
And so you presumably came in after Deutsch, but you identified in the nineties, somehow identified it as the thing that is worth following up on and building on. And instead of talking about more abstractly, I'd love to actually just share the story of like, the first answer of how how did you know that this is a thing to, of all the things that were happening in physics and computing, etcetera, that I want to think about this problem. Sure, sure.
Ried Feynman writes this great paper in 1982, David Deutsch writes an absolutely fantastic paper in 1985, sort of sketching out a lot of the fundamental ideas of quantum computing. So I'm 11 in 1985, I'm not thinking about this, I'm playing soccer and doing whatever. But in 1992 I took a class on quantum mechanics that was really terrific given by Jared Milburn and I just went and asked Jared one day after the fifth lecture or something, I said, you have anything, sort of papers or whatever that you could give me?
And he said come by my office in a couple of days' time and I did and he presented me with a giant stack of papers which included the Deutsch paper, included the Feynman paper and included a whole bunch of other very fundamental papers about quantum computing and quantum information at a time when essentially nobody in the world was working on it. He was, he'd actually, I think he wrote the very first paper that proposed I mean, sort of a practical approach to quantum computing. It wasn't very practical but it was actually in a real system and so in some sense, you know, I'm benefiting from the taste of this other person.
But as soon as I read the papers or take a look at the papers, these are exciting papers. They're asking very fundamental questions and you're sort of like, oh, I can make progress here. These are things that one could potentially work on.
Deutsch has this sort of conjecture that basically, yeah, there should be, I don't know what the right term for it is, thesis or what you would call it, that a universal model quantum Turing machine should be capable of efficiently simulating any system, any physical system at all. This is a very provocative idea. I think in that paper, he more or less claims that he's proved it.
I'm not sure that necessarily everybody would agree with that. There's questions about whether or not you can simulate quantum field theory effectively and that kind of question is I think very interesting and very exciting there. It's obviously a fundamental question about the universe.
You know, here's some wonderful ideas in there about sort of quantum algorithms and where they come from and what they mean and what they relate to the meaning of the wave function and questions like this which is still not, it's not agreed upon amongst physicists. So yeah, there's just some sense of, oh, I am in contact with something which is A, deeply important and B, we as a civilization don't have this. And so of course you start to focus your attention a little bit there.
I'm not sure I got the answer to the question that
Maybe I misunderstood the question.
me think about how to phrase it. Maybe I'll explain the motivation first. So in a previous conversation we were discussing, how could you have done in 1940s, the Shannon CRMs?
And Shannon's way of thinking about communication channel is a deep idea that goes beyond the problems with pulse code modulation that Bell Labs was trying to solve at the time and it applies to everything from quantum mechanics to genetics to computer science obviously. And one of the I think an idea you you stated that we didn't get a chance to talk about yet was this idea. Shannon publishes paper.
There's all these other papers, but there's some market of follow ups where people gravitate to and build upon Shannon's work. And how do they realize that that's thing to do and how does that process happen? And so I guess you gave your local answer.
You read these papers and you immediately realized, Okay, there's work to be done here, there's a low hanging fruit, there's some deep provocative idea that I need to better understand and I could attractively make progress on.
mean, so to some extent you're sort of saying, okay, I wanted to get into this game of contributing to humanity's understanding of the universe and you are applying this low hanging fruit algorithm, you're like relative to my particular set of interests and abilities, where should I pick up my shovel and start digging? There it was like oh, this looks like quite a good place to start digging. You know, and different people of course, you know, chose very differently.
Was a very unusual choice at the time. It was 1992.
Very few people were thinking about that. Yeah. Fast forwarding a bit, so you've been, I don't know how you think about your work on the open science movement now, but did it work?
Like what have what a successful there look like? What it that the movement is trying to accomplish?
the set of ideas about open science, I mean, it's interesting. You didn't stop and define open science there, which I think twenty years ago you would have had to do. People recognize the frights, people have some set of associations with it.
Most often they have a relatively simple set of associations. It means maybe something about making scientific papers open access. Very often they have some set of notions about maybe it means also making code openly available, maybe it means making data openly available.
But already those are I think very large successes of the open science movement, which is to make those salient issues. Those are issues on which people have opinions and then there are relatively common arguments. An argument like, so this is of the meme version, you know, publicly funded science should be open science.
That's a distillation of a set of ideas which you might be able to contest, but if you can get people actually sort of thinking about it and engaged with that kind of argument, that's a very fundamental kind of an issue to be considering in the whole political economy of science. If you go back, say three centuries, there was a very similar kind of an argument prosecuted which is the question, do we publicly disclose our scientific results or not. So if you look at people like Galileo and Kepler and so on, the extent to which they publicly disclosed, like it was done in a very odd kind of a way.
Sometimes they did bizarre things where famously they published some of their results as anagrams so basically they'd find some discovery, they would write down the result in sort of a sentence like the discovery of the I'm trying to think of an example, I think the moons of Mars I think was one such example. I'm getting it wrong, was it Hooke's Law? Anyway, it doesn't matter.
The point was they wrote it down but then they'd scramble it, publish that, and then if somebody else later made the same discovery they would unscramble the anagram and say, oh, I actually did it first. This is not an ideal way, this is not an ideal foundation for a discovery system. And then it took, I mean, a very long time, over a century I think to obtain more or less modern ideals in which what you do is you disclose the knowledge in the form of a paper.
There is then an expectation of attribution and so there is a kind of reputation economy which gets built and so basically, oh such and such did this work so they deserve the credit for that and that's then the basis for their careers. So this is sort of the underlying political economy of science and that made a lot of sense when what you've got is a printing press and the ability to do scientific journals. Then you transition to this modern situation where in fact you can start to share a lot more.
You can start to share your code, you can start to share your data, you can start to share in progress ideas but there's no direct credit associated to those. It's not at all obvious sort of how much reputation should be associated to them. That's all constructed socially and so making it a live issue is I think a very important thing to have done and that's, I view anyway, one of the main positive outcomes of work on open science.
Shelley, I'll give you a really practical sort of example to illustrate the problem. For a long time in physics, there was a preprint culture in which people would upload preprints to the preprint archive and in biology, this didn't happen. There was no preprint culture, that's changing now but for a long time this was the case.
And I used to of amuse myself by asking physicists and biologists why this was the case and what I would hear sometimes from biologists was they would say, well biology is so much more competitive than physics that we need to protect our priority and so we can't possibly upload to the archive, we have to just publish in journals. And then we sometimes hear from physicists, physics is so much more competitive than biology that we need to establish our priority by uploading as rapidly as possible to the preprint archive. We can't possibly wait to do it with the journals.
And I think this emphasizes the extent to which this kind of attribution economy is just something we construct, is just something which we do by sort of agreement and so any attempt to sort of change that economy results in a different system by which we construct knowledge so there is sort of this very fundamental set of problems around the political economy of science. We've got this collective project and how we mediate it depends upon the economy we have around ideas.
One of the sort of things you've emphasized as a part of this project of open science is collective science or groups of people were making progress on a problem where no individual understands all the logical and explanatory levels necessary to make a leap or a connection.
of such a discovery? I mean, I'm not sure I have a well ordering of them to give you a best, but I mean, I think an example that I think is very interesting is the LHC where it's just this immensely complicated object. Years ago, I snuck into an accelerator physics conference.
I didn't know anything at all about accelerator physics but I was just kind of curious to see what they were talking about and this particular group of people were experts on numerical methods, in particular on inverse methods and so basically it turns out, you know, inside these accelerators you have these cascades so a particle will be massively accelerated, maybe it will be collided and then you'll get a shower of particles which decays and decays and decays and there's just this incredible sort of consequential shower which is ultimately what you see at the detector and then you have to retroactively figure out what produced it. And so there's these very, very complicated sort of inverse problems need be solved. You've got this final data but you need to figure out what produced it and that's how you look for sort of signatures of these.
And what many of these people were was they were incredibly deep experts on simulation methods for sort of following particle tracks. And this was really deep and difficult stuff and I'm like wow, you could spend a lifetime just learning sort of how to do this and how to solve some of these inverse problems and you would know nothing about or you would know very little about quantum field theory, you would know very little about detector physics, would know very little about vacuum physics, all these other things that are absolutely, very little about data processing, very little about all these things that are absolutely essential to understanding the Higgs boson. And I don't think it's possible for one person to understand everything in-depth.
Lots of people understand broadly a lot of these ideas but they don't understand sort of everything in the depth that is actually utilized. That's why there's these papers with well over a thousand authors and those people can, yeah, they can talk to one another at a high level but they don't understand each other's specialties. Interesting.
Things like, as I say, detective physics, vacuum physics, these kinds of solving of inverse problems, this stuff is incredibly different from each other and to understand it in real detail is serious work.
How do you think about prolificness versus depth where I don't know maybe Darwin's an example of somebody who's like just gestating on something for many decades. There's other examples where Einstein during the year comes with special relativity just doing a bunch of different things. Pius talks about how they were all relevant to the eventual build up.
mean it's something I stress about a lot, sometimes I feel like I'm too slow. Actually it's funny though, I mean the Darwin example is really interesting, like Prolific at what? God knows how many letters he wrote.
It must have been an enormous number. So he was certainly very active. There's also like there's two types of work that tends to be involved in any kind of creative project.
There's routine stuff and there you just want to avoid procrastination, you just want to like how do I get good at this or how do I outsource it and how do I do it as rapidly as possible and just avoid getting into a situation where you are prolonging it. And then there is high variance stuff where you actually, you need to be willing to take a lot of time, you need to be willing to go to the different places and talk to the different people where in any given instance most of it is just not going to be an input. Somehow sort of balancing those two things, I think a lot of people are very good at doing one or the other but it's hard to, it's almost like a personality trait, sort of which one you prefer and people tend to end up doing a lot of one and not enough of the other.
So I certainly try and balance those two things. Mean Einstein is such an interesting example, I mean 1905 is just this extraordinary year, like you can delete spectral relativity entirely and it's an extraordinary year. You can delete spectral relativity and you can delete the photoelectric effect for which he won the Nobel Prize, and it's still an extraordinary year, plausibly a multi Nobel Prize winning year.
So what's he doing? Maybe the answer is just he's smarter than the rest of us. And there's a lot of luck as well.
Certainly But for myself anyway, to identify those things that are routine that I should get good at and then just try and do as quickly as possible, think that's yielded a certain amount of returns, but also being willing to bet a little bit more on myself on sort of the variance side has also been very, very, very helpful. That's really hard because intrinsically you're putting yourself in situations where you don't know what the outcome is going to be. And so if you're very driven to be productive and whatever and actually mostly it's not working over there, you're like let's reduce this, like it doesn't feel right.
When I worked in San Francisco, actually a practice I used to have each day was instead of taking the fifteen minute walk to work, I would take the more beautiful thirty minute walk to work, partially just because it was beautiful but partially also as just a reminder that there are real benefits to not being efficient. But it's not an answer to your question. Mean really I think all I'm saying is I struggle a lot with the question.
I mean there are these, Dean Keith Sivington, I forgot his exact name. Yeah. Yeah.
I know who you mean.
this famous equal odds world where he says the probability that any given thing you release, any paper, book, whatever, will be extremely important for a given person through their lifetime is not that different. And what really determines in what era they are the most productive is how much they're publishing. Any given thing has equal odds of being extremely important.
Maybe just think of some of the most successful creatives or scientists that are just doing a lot, like Shakespeare is just publishing a lot.
of course there's kind of examples, know, Godel publishing almost nothing. Broadly speaking, you need a very good reason to be avoiding it, basically to not do that. It's funny, I've met a lot of people over the years who you talk to, they're clearly brilliant and they're just obsessed that they are going to work on the great project that makes them famous and they never do anything.
And that seems connected like it's a type of aversiveness. Think very often they just don't want public judgment. Something that I would love to see, there's an awful lot of biographies and memoirs and histories of people who achieve a lot.
I wish there was like a very large of biographies of people who are fantastically talented who just missed. Like I've known people who won gold medals at IMOs and things like that who then tried to become mathematicians and failed. What happened?
What was the reason? I suspect in many cases that's actually more informative and incredibly interesting than anything else.
You have this essay I was reading before this interview about how you think about what is the work you're doing And writer doesn't seem like, as you say, was Charles Darwin a writer? Right? What what what exactly is that label?
I'm a podcaster. Right? So I'm and in in a way, obviously, our work is very different.
But I I I also think a lot about what is this work and how do I get better at it. And in particular, how I can make sure there's some compounding between the different people I talk to on the podcast where I worry that instead of this kind of compounding, there's actually I build up some understanding that's somewhat superficial about a topic and then it depreciates and I move to the next topic and sort of depreciates and so I think there's this question there's a lot of podcasters in the world who will interview way more experts than I ever have and I don't think they're much the wiser or more knowledgeable as a result. So there's it's clearly possible to mess this up.
And I wonder if you have thoughts or takes or advice on how one actually learns in a deeper way from this kind of work.
complicated and rich question. Mean it does seem like sort of the question is like how do you make it a higher growth context, how do you make it a more demanding context and sort of you can do that in relatively small ways but that might have a yield compounding returns or you can do something that is maybe more radical, maybe it means actually starting sort of a parallel project in which you do something that is actually quite a bit different. There is something I think really interesting about like how being very demanding can simply change your response to something, something that I would sometimes do students and sometimes with myself was really aimed more at myself was they would say some week I'm gonna try and do this work over the coming week and then the next week would come by and they hadn't solved the problem or whatever.
You sort of like, if a million dollars had been at stake, would you have put the same effort in? And the answer is no, sort of invariably. They've tried but they haven't really tried.
I think that's a very familiar feeling for all of us. Often you could do a lot more if you had just the right sort of demanding taskmaster standing by you and saying look you're barely operating here. And so I do sort of wonder a little bit about like what's the demanding task master, what can they ask you that is going to make your preparation way more intense?
The most helpful thing honestly is for some subjects it is very clear how I prep. Like I'm doing an upcoming episode on chip design with the founder of a company that is chip design and he wrote a textbook on chip design and he yesterday, I went over to his office and we brainstormed five sort of roofline analysis I can do. And if I understand that, I I have some good understanding.
The problem is with almost every other field, there's not this there's not like you I don't know. When I interviewed Ilya three, four years ago, it's like implement the transformer. And if you implement it, like, you have some nugget of understanding you've clamped down.
that you do this exercise and if you do it you will understand. Yeah, so I mean really what you're sort of saying is you can do a good job at podcasting without actually attaining this kind of moment and that's the problem from your You point of want to sort of change your job description so that you are internalizing these chunks and just getting this kind of integration each time And it seems to me like what that means is you actually want to change the structure of the work output at some level. Mean lots of people think, there's this terrible idea people have that they should be in flow all of the time.
And of course as far as I can tell, high performers just don't believe this at all. They are in flow some of the time, you certainly see this with athletes. When they are actually out there playing basketball or tennis or whatever, ideally they are in flow much of the time but when they're training they're not, they're stuck a lot of the time or they're doing things badly and I suppose I wonder what that looks like for you.
I would be extremely satisfied with and the problem is I just like I don't know what the equivalent of doing the 64 lapses for almost and so this is sort of a this is a thing you can change by choosing guests where there is a legible curriculum so maybe it's a mistake for not having done that. Also, there's no real way to prep for Terrence Tau or something. There's no curriculum that's a plausible one.
I think there's one failure mode. So there's many failure modes. But one is if you could do one dynamic I'm worried about a long term dynamic is that you do good you can have a good podcast and there's a local maximum but you for no particular guest or topic are you going deep enough that you've I think my model of learning is there's if you don't really understand the deeper mechanism, you're just mapping inputs and outputs of a black box.
Yeah. Yeah. And that just fades incredibly fast or is not worth it in the first place.
And Yeah. You kinda just move on and it's over. Yeah.
And you kind of need to build the intermediate connection. And it's it's I think, actually, AI in a weird way is really easy for that reason because there is a clear thing you can do, just implement it, right? And then you understand it.
We're almost, if I applied that criteria elsewhere, what am I, do I just not do history episodes?
Ada Palmer, like what wonderful to talk to, incredibly interesting but for you personally like what changed?
yeah there's some things I learned. Think I could have done if I had maybe allocated more time especially after the interview to like let's write up 2,000 words on everything I learned and how it connects to other things I know and something. And maybe that's the thing worth doing is spreading out the episodes more and spending more time afterwards consolidating.
clamp what you have learned. Have you tried doing that with somebody?
It's hard to find I mean, I haven't tried super hard, but it seems like it's really tough to find somebody who would do that for every single kind of discipline.
Maybe I should just hire different ones for different topics. Maybe or there's something about like, I mean, what problem are you solving sort of for each episode? As far as I can tell, that's the only way I really understand anything is that I get interested in something, at first I don't even have a problem but there's just some sense of there's some contribution to make here and gradually you home in and there's a problem and then Funnily enough, spending time stuck is incredibly important and that used to just be annoying, now it seems like this is actually maybe even the most important part of the whole process.
But that very hard oneness of it means that I internalize it afterwards. I often find actually if I, I've written sometimes 10,000 word essays in a couple of days and I've written them in three months or six months, I feel like I didn't learn very much from the ones only took a couple of days. I understand.
still remember. Yeah, can you describe outside of physics how you learn of the one that took three months?
things, there's always some creative artifact. Sometimes it's a class, sometimes it's engagement with a group of people who, there's some collective creative artifact that you're working on together. I mean you might not even be aware of it but you're acting as an input to their creative ends in some way.
And sometimes it's just an essay or a book or whatever. It's one of the reasons why I often quite enjoy doing podcasts. Mean particularly, I said yes to come here partially because I know you ask unusually demanding questions and so that's an attempt to get this sort of perspective from a different kind of forcing function.
So you're trying to pick sort of the most demanding creative context. Yeah, so for this interview I went through like three lectures of the Susskind Seshawarlitsky book. The problem is that there's almost no practice problems in it.
appropriately humbled. How do how do you make it as jugular as possible? Right?
Like, the higher you can raise the stakes, the better. I mean the interview is in some sense high stakes but also it doesn't necessarily test deep understanding. Yeah but I don't think the interview is that high stakes, right?
You're not writing a book about special relativity and you're not trying to write a book that replaces the current, whatever the existing standard textbook is, that's a really high, really high, phrase that I sort of find particularly difficult and it's a funny one. People will talk about going deep on a subject and it turns out different people have different ideas of what this means. Some people it means they read a couple of blog posts, some people it means they read a book about it, some people it means they wrote a book about it.
Think what your standard is, the standard you hold yourself to determines a lot about your ability to integrate knowledge in this way.
I don't know what your experience has been, but I found that I'm getting I'm in some sense able to move much faster on some things through the help of AI but I know if I'm like learning better and I think it's probably because the hardest thing the thing that is most demanding is so aversive that you try to take any excuse you can to get out of it. Yep. And just having back and forth conversation that'll where you gloss over It's entertaining, but not necessarily anything else.
Yeah. So it's such an easy way to get out of the thing. Yeah.
In fact it makes it easier because instead of doing some intermediate thinking there's always the next question you can ask a chatbot.
it's somewhat valuable, it's not, I mean that's part of the seductiveness of course, like it's not actually useless, but yeah, it can sort of substitute for actually doing the thing that maybe you should be doing. It's interesting that, like the extent to which, to what extent should you be outsourcing that kind of stuff and to what extent, there's some sort of interesting judgment call about actually, there is a whole bunch of routine work that you want done and in fact it's low value for you so you may as well get, you can get a chatbot to do it, may as well. Somebody interviewed the pioneering computer scientist Alan Kay years ago and he was asked what he thought about basically Linux and if I remember his answer correctly, basically said look, it doesn't have anything to do with computer science, it's just a great big ball of mud.
There's a few interesting ideas in there which are worth understanding but mostly all you're learning is stuff about Linux, like you're not actually learning anything which is transferable. There's a certain kind of seductiveness to some things where it's sort of a Rib Goldberg machine, you can just sort of learn about all the bits and it feels kind of entertaining, but if you step back and think about the question, what am I actually doing here, it might not actually be meeting your objectives. Maybe you want to become a sysadmin and learning Linux is a great use of your time, there's no harm in that at all, but if your objective is to understand the fundamentals of computing, it's much less clear that that's a good use of your time.
I think that was certainly an answer I've thought a lot about where you actually need to, for a certain type of mind, there is a seductiveness in just learning systems and confusing that with understanding.
Okay, I'll keep you updated on how to discuss. I owe you a text within a month of some revamped learning system. I'll be really curious if you, I mean it's also true, right, like tiny incremental improvements in this.
I mean, they're just worth so much. I know. Yeah.
It's sort of the main input into the podcast. You know? It's great that the bookshelves are fancy and I've got a Blackboard or whatever, but really, like, the thing that makes the podcast better is if I can improve the learning, I do.
So it's yes. It's worth every morsel of improvement. Mhmm.
Yeah. Alright. Thanks for the thanks for the therapy session.
Yeah. Great notes and done. Thanks, Michael.
Alright. Thanks, Prakash.
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